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Are dictatorships more prone to build and maintain roads? This paper identifies a puzzling
fact: countries that are more democratic tend to have roads in worse conditions than less
democratic countries. Using lagged values of a democracy index to instrument for
democracy in 1980 yields higher estimates of the magnitude of the association between
democracy and bad roads. Instruments based on climate, population, and education yield
similar results. The evidence points to a negative causal relationship from democracy to road
quality. I also find that changes to a more democratic government are associated with slower
growth of the road network. I advance four non-mutually exclusive hypotheses that can
explain the results and find support for one of them: dictatorships prefer a better highway
network ready for external and internal military intervention.
JEL codes: E62, H54, O17, R42
Keywords: Democracy, infrastructures, political economy1
In 1924 a dictator inaugurated the first modern motorway in the world. The Milan-
Varese motorway, which was completed under Benito Mussolini’s regime, took drivers
along 85 Km. Between 1924 and 1939, Mussolini had overseen the creation of 500 Km
of Italian autostrade, a major expansion of Europe’s incipient motorway system.
1 Adolf
Hitler was soon to follow Il Duce’s lead with the development of Germany’s 2,100 Km
autobahn system.
2 Two of the most terrible regimes in history seemed singularly
concerned about road quality. Are dictators especially prone to the building and
maintaining of highways?
  The answer to this question is important in understanding contemporary public
investment in developing countries. Consider the case of highway provision in Central
America. Costa Rica is by far the richest country in that region. With a modern welfare
state and a dynamic democracy, it is widely regarded as one of the most developed
countries in Latin America. Why is it that Costa Rica’s roads are so bad compared to
those of its neighbors?
3 The most common explanation by Costa Rican officials is that
budget pressures associated with redistribution make it difficult to assign resources to
infrastructures.
4 Are officials trying to justify their relatively poor performance or are
there explanations rooted in the political economy of highway provision?
                                                          
1 Hutchinson’s Encyclopedia (2002).
2 The autobahn system had been started during the Weimar republic, although the nazi regime fostered its
fast expansion. See Oster (1996).
3 Castro and Gavarrete (1999) use the World Economic Forum Methodology to study the efficiency of
several aspects of Central American economies. Costa Rica came the last of five Central American
countries in all transportation infrastructure categories: roads, railway system, air transportation, and ports.
The World Economic Forum rankings are based on subjective responses from entrepreneurs. According to
national surveys undertaken by CLACDS-INCAE (a prominent research institution in the region), in 1996
the percentage of roads in bad conditions was 30 percent in Guatemala, 45 percent in El Salvador, 30
percent in Honduras, 73 percent in Nicaragua, and 55 percent in Costa Rica (Saiz, 1998). Only in much
poorer and war-torn Nicaragua was the share of roads in poor conditions greater than in Costa Rica in 1996.
4 Personal communication with officials at the Costa Rican Public Finance and Transportation Ministries.2
This paper sheds some light on these questions. I use data on quality of roads for a
sample of developing countries and find that, indeed, democratic countries tend to have
roads in worse conditions all over the world.  This finding holds after controlling for
several variables that differ between democracies and dictatorial regimes. The result is
robust to instrumenting the values for a democracy index in 1980 with lagged values of
the same democracy variable, and to instrumenting with other variables such as climate
and percentage of population who are illiterate. Democratic countries tend to be much
richer than dictatorial nations, and the country sample for this exercise is tilted toward
less developed nations. I account for the hypothetical existence of heterogeneous
treatment effects by stratifying the sample into four income quartiles. Similar qualitative
results arise within income quartiles. The paper also shows that changes to a more
democratic type of government are associated with slower growth of the highway system.
The share of total capital devoted to transportation infrastructure may also be smaller in
more democratic governments. In all cases the association between democracy and
transportation infrastructure is very robust.
Four theories are advanced to explain these surprising results. First, dictatorial
governments may be more prone to spend on “white elephant” road projects. Thus, road
quality may be higher than optimal in dictatorial regimes. Second, democracies care more
about redistribution, so they give higher priority to welfare-related consumption
expenditures. Third, dictatorships may have preferences toward maintaining a good road
network ready for internal and external military intervention. Finally, electoral
competition may generate a higher discount rate among elected officials, which may push
them to give priority to new construction over maintenance.3
The paper expands the literature on the political economy of democracy. Most
previous studies have studied the “black box” or general impact of democracy on the
economy, finding positive impacts on welfare and redistribution (Sen, 1999; Rodrik,
2002). Rodrik (2002) argues that democracies yield long-run growth rates that are more
predictable, produce greater short-term stability, and handle adverse shocks much better.
Rivera-Batiz (2002) finds that democracy is a statistically significant variable affecting
total factor productivity. He finds that this effect is mediated through the higher quality of
governance in democracies. The literature has found a null overall association of
democracy with economic growth (Tavares and Warcziag, 2000, and references therein).
This paper looks at one important aspect inside the black box of the impact of democracy
on economic outcomes (namely public investment in highways) and complements
previous literature on the political economy of investment. Alesina and Perotti (1996)
find that political instability reduces investment; more closely related to this paper,
Tavares and Warcziag (2000) find a negative association between democracy and
investment. How do political institutions affect public investment?
Methodology, Data and Results
The paper is interested in estimating the treatment effect of democracy on road
quality. The main specification is the equation:
(1)  ii i i PD e m X     
Where  i P  is the share of paved roads in poor condition in country i,  i Dem is an index
of democracy, and  i X a vector of other country-specific variables.4
I obtain the dependent variable on road quality from Canning (1996). The quality
variable is available for a sample of developing countries (see Data Appendix).
5 The
source for the democracy index is the Gastil index of political rights: the index is
published yearly and takes seven discrete values. I use a transformation in Barro (1996)
where the values of the index are bound between zero (less democratic) and one (more
democratic).
6 In 1980, for example, the indicator took value zero in Somalia, 0.5 in
Morocco and one in Costa Rica.
Other country specific data are obtained from Barro and Lee (1995), Summers and
Heston (1995), the World Income Inequality Database from the United Nations
Development Program, Harvard CID, and other sources. More information on the data
sources and units is in the Data Appendix.
Table 1 presents the results of the general regressions. In all the regressions the
dependent variable is the share of paved roads in bad condition in 1984,
7 the year for
which the data are available.
8 The independent variable of interest is the democracy index
in 1980. The four-year lag structure minimizes the Akaike criterion
9 and allows the
impact of durable investments to show up after the typical duration of a democratic
legislature. The basic regression (column 1) includes the logs of country area and income
as additional explanatory variables for the quality of roads. The democracy index in 1980
is a significant predictor of poor road quality in 1980. Going from a total dictatorship
                                                          
5 There are 75 countries with data on road quality. Of these I cannot match two of them to data on the
democracy index.
6 I have to thank Jose Tavares for the data. The correlation of the index of political rights, which I use here,
with the related Gastil index of civil rights is close to 0.95.
7 Unpaved roads are not always a control variable of governments, as they can be old pathways and local or
private highways.
8 The data are available for 1988 for only a subset of 36 African countries.5
(index 0) to a total democracy (index 1) is associated with a 14 percent increase in the
share of roads in poor condition. Since more democratic nations are generally richer I try
to avoid the democracy indicator capturing non-linear effects of income by including the
square of log income in column 2. The democracy effect goes up, and this is consistent
with the fact that democracies are richer and that the share of paved roads in bad
condition is smaller in richer countries.
It is well known that road deterioration is a function of climatic variables
(International Study of Highway Development and Management Tools, 1995). And at the
same time there is a remarkably high negative correlation (-0.469) between the log of
average country temperature and the democracy index. This negative association between
temperature and democracy persists after controlling for other variables: the coefficient
of log temperature on the democracy index has a t-statistic of -2.96 in a regression that
controls for log income, log area, and log population. The log of precipitation has a t-
statistic of 2 in the same regression. Thus colder and rainy countries tend to be more
democratic. I control for the effects of climate on road quality in two ways. In column 3 I
include dummies for 5 climate groups. I obtain the groups by standardizing the
temperature and precipitation variables and conducting a kmeans cluster analysis.
10 In
column 4 I just control for log temperature and precipitation.  Column 5 controls for the
average mean elevation of the country: road maintenance costs are higher in mountainous
                                                                                                                                                                            
9 I run the regression in column 1 with specifications with 0 to 10 lags in the democracy index and choose
the one that minimizes the Akaike criterion. Results are similar irrespective of the lag specification.
10 I conduct a kmeans cluster partition using Euclidean distances on the space of the two standardized
variables.6
terrain. None of the geographic control variables is significant in the specifications and
the coefficient on democracy remains unchanged.
11
To allow for other regional omitted variables I also include three dummies for sub-
Saharan Africa, Latin America, and East Asia. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) argue that
for these regions “previous researchers
12 have observed that growth rates are surprisingly
low or high,” which might point to possible idiosyncrasies in the regions’ political or
economic systems. The results (column 6) suggest that the democracy effect on road
quality is not driven by such regional particularities.
Column 7 controls for the impact of productivity, proxied by past (1965-1980) long
run growth of GDP per capita, which could be correlated with both democracy and road
quality. Results are robust to the inclusion of the economic growth variable, which is a
significant predictor of road quality.
Alesina and Perotti (1996) have shown that a country’s political instability reduces
investment. Is the democracy index capturing the effects of external or internal regime
instability on the investment on durable public goods? Columns 8 and 9 include the
fraction of time that the country spent in wars during the 1965-1980 period and the
Barro-Lee measure of average political instability during the 1980-84 period. The results
yield similar estimates of the coefficient on the democracy index.
13
                                                          
11 In unreported regressions I also control for three other geographic variables: the percentage of population
living within 100km from the coast or navigable river, the typical density experienced by an individual, and
the percentage area in geographical tropics. Results are very robust.
12 See also Barro (1991).
13 The implicit view in the inclusion of the variable is that democracy in 1980 may be associated with
posterior instability. The causation line between political stability and democracy could be reversed. In a
complementary regression I add a pre-1980 political instability index and obtain similar results.7
Columns 10 and 11 control for the possible decreasing marginal productivity in road
maintenance. If democracies serve more people or provide more extensive access the
results may be a mechanical product of decreasing returns (i.e. it may be that most roads
are of the same quality and it is only the marginal difficult-to-build extensions that are
necessarily worse in democracies). Controlling for the log of population and the log of
paved road length does not substantially affect the results. Conditional on the same
population size and highway network length, democracies provide lower quality over the
road network.
14
Similarly, we should control for a possible vintage effect. Countries that developed
earlier may tend to be more democratic and may also have older stocks of highways. This
spurious association could explain the statistical relationship between democracy and
poor road quality. I control for some of this effect by the inclusion of road length in
column 11. The length of the highway system seems to follow an error correction model
(Canning, 1995). It is thus possible that countries that developed earlier and are relatively
overinvested in roads rationally decide to depreciate part of the stock. But the vintage
effects may also entail a higher cost of maintenance everywhere on the optimal road
network. To control for this early development problem, I include the log of GDP per
capita in 1960 (column 12). Early development does not account for the impact of
democracy on roads.
Democracy is not a randomized treatment assignment. However, reverse causation in
this exercise seems difficult a priori: the quality of the roads seems an implausible
                                                          
14 Randolph, Bogetic and Hefley (1996) suggest that the urbanization rate, the labor force participation rate
and the size of the foreign sector are also amongst the most important predictors for investment in8
determinant of a country’s political rights.
15 The real potential problem with the
interpretation of   is the existence of omitted variables that are correlated with both the
democracy index in 1980 and road quality in 1984. Table 2 presents 2SLS instrumental
variables estimation of equation (1). I try to find variables that are correlated with the
democracy index in 1980 but plausibly orthogonal to road conditions in 1984. In column
1 the instruments are past values of the democracy index (1972 to 1975): these should be
exogenous to variables affecting road quality nine or more years later. Column 2 uses the
log of average temperature and precipitation, log of population, the percentage of people
with no schooling in 1980 and the average schooling years in 1980 as instruments for the
democracy index in 1980.
16 Results in Table 1 are consistent with these exclusion
restrictions. In both specifications the estimated democracy effect is higher, but so are the
estimated standard errors.
17  Tables 1 and 2 provide the same qualitative results, and I
cannot reject that the quantitative results are similar.
18
How generalizable are the results to the full distribution of world countries? The data
are only available for a set of relatively low-income countries. In fact, the correlation
between the democracy index and the log of income is about 0.6 in the overall world
                                                                                                                                                                            
infrastructure in developing countries. Unreported specifications of the model used these variables without
much change in the quantitative or statistical significance of the democracy index.
15 Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1996) find no contemporary causal link between low economic
growth (a more plausible economic determinant of democracy) and the propensity to government changes.
16 Barro (1999), shows that population and education levels are good predictors of the democracy index.
Other variables proposed by Barro (1999) – GDP, urbanization rates and oil-producing country dummy- are
not plausibly exogenous to road quality.
17 This is consistent with the fact that the democracy index in any given year is a noisy indicator of actual
democracy: this fact may bias the estimates in Table 1 downward.
18 In Appendix Table A.3 I present the results from a Heckman-type treatment effects selection model. I
create a dummy variable for democracy that takes value 1 if the democracy index is greater than 0.5 (recall
that the index takes values from 0 to 1).  The table presents the results of the maximum likelihood
estimation of the selection into democracy treatment (column 2), and the treatment effect (column 1). The
specification allows for covariance between the random terms in both equations.9
sample. If the democracy “treatment effect” on road quality is heterogeneous and
contingent on income, the results in the regressions may not tell us much about the
general impact of democracy on road quality. The model with heterogeneous treatment
effects becomes:
(2)  ii i i i PD e m X     
As the main concern is about heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to income,
I use a simple stratification technique (Rosenbaum, 1995): I divide the sample into four
income quartiles and estimate a separate democracy impact for each quartile (Table 3).
The results are imprecise (each quartile has only 17 observations), but they are very
robust: democracy is associated with lower road quality within each income quartile. The
specification in Table 3 also helps us see that the results in Table 1 are not driven by
outlier observations. 
19
Do the results in the previous tables indicate that democracies tend to have overall
lower investments in roads? Clearly, that also depends on the length of the road network.
Column 1 in Table 4 answers the question: do democracies provide more extensive
highway systems? For comparability, I limit the sample to those countries for which I
have information on road quality, and control for log income, log area, long-run
economic growth, political instability (the usual suspects in terms of statistical
significance in the previous regressions), plus log of population and the climate group
dummies. The results are inconclusive. A total democracy (democracy index=1) has a
paved road system about 40% longer than a total dictatorship (democracy index=0),10
although the result is not significant. The problem with the interpretation of this result is
that while quality is a stationary variable that depends on a control variable
(maintenance), road length is basically a unit root series that integrates past additions to
the stock. If democracies tend to have longer histories as industrialized countries they
may have stocked up longer road networks. Thus, for example, Mussolini’s autostrade
could wrongly be attributed to the contemporaneous Italian democratic system. Recent
changes in road length are indeed a control variable of democratic governments and a
stationary series.
In Table 5 I consider the eight-year change in the length of paved roads from 1980 to
1988 (the long difference on the full length of the series). I use eight-year differences of
the variables in Table 1 as controls, except for those variables that are fixed for each
country (the fixed variables are area, climatic variables, fraction time at war between
1960-1980, income in 1960, and 1965-80 income growth). As road construction follows
an error adjustment process, I also include the log of initial road length (1980). Since
planning, budgeting and building new roads is not instantaneous, changes in democracy
and the other variables are unlikely to affect road length contemporaneously. Thus I use
lagged eight-year changes of the independent variables.
20 I implement the Akaike
criterion to select the optimal lag structure, which is, again, four years. Table 5 shows
how a 0-1 change in the democracy indicator from 1976 to 1984 is associated with a
decrease of about 25% in the growth of the road network from 1980 to 1988. Since the
                                                                                                                                                                            
19 In fact, the results are similar in different quantiles of the dependent variable. Quantile regression of
specifications similar to those in Table 1 yield coefficients of the democracy index equal to 0.17 (0.33
quantile), 0.181 (median) and 0.182 (quantile 0.66).11
change in the democracy index between two years is bound to be relatively noisy, column
2 uses the more stable Barro-Lee five year average values of the political and civil rights
indexes (80-84, 75-79 and 70-74) as instruments for the 76-80 change in democracy.  The
negative association between increased democracy and a deceleration in new road
investment holds in the IV specification (column 2).
Consistent with lower quality and decreased investment in new roads, democratic
government policies seem to be less complementary with transportation capital
investment. In Table 4, column 2, the democracy index is associated with a lower share
of total capital per worker in transportation infrastructure, although there are a reduced
number of observations and the result is not significant at the conventional levels.
4 Hypotheses
The paper so far has shown how democracy is associated with lower road quality.
Changes toward a more democratic government are associated with a deceleration in new
road construction. Here I posit several explanations of the political economy of this fact,
and conduct simple tests that reinforce one of them. The results have to be taken with
caution because of the small samples that I can muster.
First it may be that dictatorial governments have a preference for “white elephant”
projects with lower social returns. It may be that roads are more conspicuous – a good
highway network could be used as an indicator of government competency for foreign
observers and a source of international prestige for dictatorships. For example, according
                                                                                                                                                                            
20 The Barro-Lee Database only offers five-year stability indexes, so I take the difference between the index
in the period 1980-84 and the period 1975-79.12
to Oster (1996) “Hitler had grasped how popularly and effectively motorway construction
could be sold as a means of propaganda.” Under this scenario, dictatorships chose a road
quality level above the optimal one. Highway spending may also be government
expenditure category where corruption and cronyism are facilitated. A suitable example
is the association between Nicaragua’s Anastasio Somoza’s government preference for
roads and public works built with concrete from the Somoza family factories. As Barro
(1996) argues, “democratic institutions provide a check on governmental power and
thereby limit the potential of public officials to amass personal wealth.” Unfortunately,
corruption indexes are only widely available for recent periods, and I can only match
them to 1984 road quality data for 19 countries.
 21  But I can use the observations without
road data in 1984 to see whether dictatorships tend to be associated with more corruption.
After controlling for income, corruption and the democracy index are effectively
orthogonal. It is thus unlikely that corruption accounts for the impact of democracy on
roads.  With the data available, I cannot test for the use of roads as a source of prestige or
means of propaganda for dictatorships.
Second, democracies have preferences for redistributive expenditures (Rodrik, 2002;
Sen, 1999). Alesina and Rodrik (1992) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) demonstrate that
more inequality implies more redistribution through capital taxation and thus lower
investment in democratic countries. These authors do not find any relationship between
inequality and investment in dictatorships. In a democratic regime the median voter may
prefer redistributive expenditures to highway maintenance (a type of public capital
                                                          
21 I use the corruption perception index from Transparency International (average from 1980 to 1985). The
index is available for only 54 countries.13
investment). If this is true, democracies should maintain better road networks when
poverty or inequality are less of a problem, even if they have general preferences for
redistribution. In contrast, dictatorships should be relatively insensitive to poverty levels.
To instrumentalize this idea, I interact the democracy index with the share of population
that is illiterate. Since the contemporaneous value of this indicator is bound to be
endogenous to democracy (i.e. democracy reduces contemporary illiteracy), I use its 1960
historical level. The evidence is not consistent with the hypothesis for investments in
highway quality (Table 6, column 1). Democracies with higher historical illiteracy levels
tend to have better roads, but the correlation is not significant.
22
Third, military governments may choose to invest in a well-maintained road system
that facilitates the transportation of troops ready for internal repression and external
intervention. If this is true, military spending and road maintenance are relatively more
complementary the more military-oriented the government. Therefore we should also see
that more militaristic democracies maintain relatively better road systems. Take, for
example, the development of the United States Interstate Highway system. A retired
general (President Eisenhower) oversaw the development of the transcontinental
superhighway system. As a participant in the U.S. army’s first transcontinental motor
convoy from Washington D.C. to San Francisco in 1919 and an admirer of Germany’s
autobahnen, Eisenhower was well aware of the strategic advantages of an integrated and
well-maintained highway system.
23  The military importance of the U.S. highway system
was explicitly acknowledged by its official name - “National System of Interstate and
                                                          
22 I conducted similar regressions with the earliest historical values of the country’s Gini coefficient: the
results were similar. Democratic countries with higher Gini coefficients (more inequality) tend to have
better roads on average, but the association is not statistically significant.14
Defense Highways.” Do more militaristic democracies maintain better roads? In Table 6,
column 2, I interact the democracy index with military spending as a share of GDP
during the 1975-1979 period. The effect of the democracy index on poor road quality is
significantly smaller for democratic governments with higher military buildups. The
result is consistent with the idea of relative complementarity between military
expenditures and highway maintenance.
24
Fourth, democratic governments may choose to under-maintain roads as an
inconspicuous way to transfer public debt to future governments (Alesina and Tabellini,
1990). Gwilliam and Shalizi (1999) argue that “current political pressures or the electoral
cycle may result in myopic decisions (…); road deterioration reveals its symptoms late.
Expenditures on timely maintenance do not yield such obvious improvements in system
performance as do expenditures over new investment.” Consider for instance “the
Bruning government of Weimar Germany who hoped to tackle motorway construction as
a measure to create jobs. […]. But the continual changes of government, elections and
dissolutions of the Reichstag in the moribund Weimar Republic meant that the plans
could not be translated into action” (Oster, 1996). The national socialist party opposed
the plans for the development of the motorway system during the Weimar Republic that
“were branded a capitalist bourgeois waste of money for the benefit of only a few
motorists” (op. Cit.). But such plans were swiftly and aggressively pursued under Hitler’s
dictatorial grip.
                                                                                                                                                                            
23 Weingroff (1996).
24 Note that including total military spending allows for a general crowding out effect of such spending
categories on other government outlays. The relevant parameter for the current discussion is the interaction
between military spending and democracy.15
Alesina and Tabellini (1990) argue that “the equilibrium level of government debt is
larger (…) the more likely [it] is that the current government will not be elected.” Similar
results might be expected for the lack of road maintenance in democratic countries. I
apply this idea by interacting the 1980 democracy dummy with the 75-79 political
instability index. Democratic governments in more unstable countries should discount
more the future and spend less in road maintenance. Actually (Table 6, column 3), a more
unstable democracy is associated with higher road quality, although this association is not
significant.
Conclusions
This paper analyzes the relationship between democracy and road quality. I find that
more democratic governments tend to have road systems in worse conditions. Changes
towards a more democratic system are associated with deceleration in the construction of
new highways. The results seem consistent with a preference towards projects that are of
the “white elephant” type or that enhance the image of dictatorial regimes. But I find
evidence consistent with the view that military governments may choose to invest in a
well-maintained road system that facilitates the transportation of troops ready for internal
repression and external intervention.References
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(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.026) (0.027)
Log Mean Elevation -0.007 -0.009 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.017 0.016
(0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026)
Log(GDPcap 1980)-Log(GDPcap 1965) -0.187 -0.183 -0.175 -0.179 -0.195 -0.21
(0.074)** (0.075)** (0.075)** (0.075)** (0.078)** (0.083)**
Fraction of time in war (65-80) 0.076 0.022 0.022 0.002 -0.033
(0.113) (0.101) (0.103) (0.095) (0.088)
Political inestability index 1980-84 0.21 0.208 0.217 0.279
(0.115)* (0.116)* (0.111)* (0.108)**
Log 1984 Population 0.009 0.034 0.031
(0.018) (0.032) (0.033)
Log 1984 Paved Road Lenght -0.028 -0.027
(0.034) (0.034)
Log 1960 per Capita Income -0.039
(0.068)
Constant 0.361 4.122 3.973 4.018 3.824 4.146 3.942 3.398 3.572 3.602 4.826 5.686
(0.223) (2.269)* (2.289)* (2.240)* (2.241)* (2.345)* (2.412) (2.232) (2.176) (2.225) (2.015)** (2.026)***
Climate Dummies no no yes no no no no no no no no no
Geographic Dummies no no no no yes no no no no no no no
Observations 73 73 73 73 71 71 68 67 67 67 59 58
R-squared 0.14 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.41 0.43
Heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Share Paved Roads in Poor Condition in 1984
TABLE 1
Democracy to the Road(1) (2)
Instrumented
† Democracy Index (1980) 0.221 0.325
(0.105)** (0.189)*
Log Land Area 0.029 0.027
(0.013)** (0.015)*
Log 1984 per Capita Income -0.028 -0.043
(0.035) (0.053)
Log(GDPcap 1980)-Log(GDPcap 1965) -0.182 -0.134
(0.076)** (0.084)






Heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Share Paved Roads in Poor 
Condition in 1984
TABLE 2
Instrumental Variables: 2SLS estimates
† Equation (1) uses the democracy indexes in 1972,1973,1974 and 1975 as
instruments for the democracy index in 1980. Equation (2) uses log of average
temperature, log of average precipitation, log of population, the percentage of
population with no schooling in 1980, and average schooling years in the total
population in 1980 as instruments for the 1980 democracy index.Share Paved Roads in 
Poor Condition in 
1984
First Income Quartile * Democracy 0.409
(0.429)
Second Income Quartile * Democracy 0.151
(0.118)
Third Income Quartile * Democracy 0.164
(0.140)
Fourth Income Quartile * Democracy 0.267
(0.099)***
Log Land Area 0.025
(0.012)**
Log(GDPcap 1980)-Log(GDPcap 1965) -0.216
(0.085)**




Income Quartile Dummies yes
Observations 68
R-squared 0.33
Heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 3
Heterogeneous Treatment EffectsLog 1984 Paved 
Road Length
Transportation 
Equipment as a Share 
of Capital (1984)
(1) (2)
Democracy Index (1980) 0.475 -4.172
(0.297) (3.744)
Log 1984 per Capita Income 0.918 1.634
(0.134)*** (1.255)
Log Land Area 0.081 0.627
(0.080) (1.705)
Log 1985 Population 0.835 -1.34
(0.086)*** (1.489)
Log(GDPcap 1980)-Log(GDPcap 1965) 0.073 2.265
-0.344 (4.993)




Climate Dummies yes yes
Observations 60 31
R-squared 0.87 0.21
Heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 4
Democracy and the Extent of the Transportation System(1) (2)
OLS IV
Democracy Index Difference 1984-1976 -0.237 -0.251
(0.108)** (0.121)**
Log(GDPcap 1984)-Log(GDPcap 1976) 0.562 0.561
(0.128)*** (0.127)***
Log(Pop 84)-Log(Pop 76) -0.134 -0.152
(0.700) (0.693)
Change in Political Stability Index 84/80-79/75 -0.147 -0.153
(0.160) (0.158)






Heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Log(paved roads 1988)-Log(paved roads 1980)
TABLE 5
Changes in Democracy and Highway Length
Equation (2) uses the Barro-Lee 5-year averages (70-74,75-79,80-84) of the political and civil rights indexes as 
instruments for the change in the democracy index from 1976 to 1980. (1) (2) (3)
Democracy Index (1980) 0.293 0.313 0.204
(0.244) (0.100)*** (0.091)**
Democracy 1980 * Share Illiterate in 1960 -0.307
(0.380)
Share Illiterate in 1960 0.126
(0.200)
Democracy Index * Share Military Expenditure 1975-79 -6.218
(2.549)**
Share Military Expenditure 1975-79 2.111
(0.781)***
Instability * Democracy Index -0.356
(0.573)
Political Instability 1979-1980 0.337
(0.228)
Log Land Area 0.018 0.029 0.02
-0.015 (0.013)** (0.012)
Log 1984 per Capita Income -0.012 -0.032 -0.022
(0.055) (0.035) (0.031)
Log(GDPcap 1980)-Log(GDPcap 1965) -0.177 -0.181 -0.176
(0.097)* (0.078)** (0.076)**
Constant 0.054 0.06 0.113
(0.534) (0.286) (0.255)
Observations 49 66 68
R-squared 0.19 0.3 0.32
Heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Share Paved Roads in Poor 
Condition in 1984
TABLE 6
Testing Three HypothesesVariable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Share Paved Roads in Poor Condition in 1984 74 0.25 0.17 0.00 0.96
Democracy Index (1980) 73 0.37 0.30 0.00 1.00
1984 per Capita Income (1985 U.S. $) 73 1,869.41 1,596.60 310.00 8,162.00
Land Area (sq. Km) 73 817,900.90 1,532,967.00 2,230.00 9,326,410.00
Average Temperature (Degrees Celsius) 74 22.30 5.35 9.20 31.10
Average Precipitation (mm per sq.m.) 74 1,170.39 786.26 19.70 3,869.00
Log(GDPcap 1980)-Log(GDPcap 1965) 68 0.30 0.32 -0.34 1.09
Fraction of time in war (65-80) 69 0.10 0.21 0.00 1.00
Political inestability index 1980-84 72 0.11 0.16 0.00 0.93
1985 Population (thousands) 73 43,812.14 148,599.50 381.00 1,036,803.00
1984 Paved Road Length (Km.) 65 23,163.40 94,749.77 300.00 758,236.00
1988 Paved Road Length (Km.) 61 29,115.98 114,473.40 340.00 884,842.00
1960 per Capita Income (1985 U.S. $) 67 828.16 647.64 208.00 3,271.00
Democracy Index (1976) 73 0.27 0.28 0.00 1.00
Political inestability index 1975-79 71 0.13 0.18 0.00 0.93
Share of GDP in Military Expenditure 1975-79 68 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.27
Share Illiterate in 1960 50 0.60 0.25 0.12 0.99
Appendix TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democracy Index (1975) 0.465 0.378
(0.252)* -0.303
Democracy Index (1974) 2.255 2.25
(1.126)** (1.233)*
Democracy Index (1973) -2.211 -2.199
(1.043)** (1.107)*
Democracy Index (1972) 0.203 0.169
(0.136) (0.149)
Log Land Area -0.027 -0.08
(0.020) (0.032)**
Log 1984 per Capita Income 0.069 0.163
(0.054) (0.083)*
Log(GDPcap 1980)-Log(GDPcap 1965) -0.05 -0.105
(0.114) (0.141)
Political inestability index 1980-84 -0.185 -0.204
(0.188) (0.235)
Log Average Temperature 0.159 0.134
(0.162) (0.173)
Log Average Precipitation -0.051 -0.063
(0.050) (0.051)
Log 1984 Population 0.004 0.066
(0.026) (0.034)*
Share Illiterate in 1980 -0.008 -0.007
(0.003)** (0.003)**
Average Schooling Years in 1980 -0.061 -0.089
(0.053) (0.053)
Constant 0.157 0.062 0.827 0.301
(0.040)*** (0.432) (0.732) (1.083)
Observations 73 68 58 56
R-squared 0.45 0.49 0.2 0.34
F-statistic 13.73 6.95 2.56 2.64
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Democracy Index (1980)
Appendix TABLE 2






Democracy Dummy Variable Indicator 0.271
(0.127)**
Log Land Area 0.034 -0.395
(0.016)** (0.159)**
Log 1984 per Capita Income -0.048 0.796
(0.046) (0.402)**
Log(GDPcap 1980)-Log(GDPcap 1965) -0.159 -0.799
(0.089)* (0.720)
Political instability index 1980-84 0.205
(0.111)*
Democracy Index (1975) 1.493
(1.287)
Democracy Index (1972) 0.228
(0.492)
Log 1985 Population 0.343
(0.144)**
Log Average Temperature 0.05
(0.614)





Heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Appendix TABLE 3
"Treatment Effects" Selection Model
Equation (1) is the main (treatment effect) equation. Equation (2) is the selection (into 
treatment) equation.Data Appendix
Variable Source Description
Share Paved roads in bad
condition
Canning (1995)
Democracy Index Freedom House (1972-1990) The transformation in the
paper follows Barro (1996)
and takes on seven discrete
values. From 0 (less
democracy) to 1 (more
democracy).
Land Area CIA, World Fact Book 2001 Size of land, square Km.
Per capita income (several
years)
Penn Tables, v.5.6.a Real GDP per capita in
constant dollars (Chain index),
expressed in international
prices, base 1985).
Average Temperature www.worldcimate.com Average temperature (degrees
Celsius) in capital city or other
available main city.
Average Precipitation www.worldcimate.com Average precipitation
(milliliters per square meter)
in capital city or other
available main city.
Fraction of time in war (65-
80)
Barro and Lee (1995) The fraction of time over
1960-85 involved in external
war.
Political Instability Index Barro and Lee (1995) The index is based on the
number of assassinations and
revolutions per year, averaged
over 5-year periods.
Population (several years) Penn Tables, v.5.6.a
Paved Road Length (1984,
1988)






Barro and Lee (1995)
Percentage Population with no
schooling (1980)
Barro and Lee (1995)
Average Schooling Years in
the Total Population (1980)
Barro and Lee (1995)
Political Rights Index (5 year
averages, several periods)
Barro and Lee (1995) It is an average of the Gastil
Index of Political Rights over
5 years. Goes from 1 (more
political rights) to 7 (less
political rights).
Civil Rights Index (5 year
averages, several periods)
Barro and Lee (1995) It is an average of the Gastil
Index of Civil Rights over 5years. Goes from 1 (more civil
rights) to 7 (less civil rights).
Mean Elevation Harvard CID – Geography
Datasets (Compiled by John L.
Gallup, Andrew D. Mellinger,
and Jeffrey D. Sachs)
Mean elevation (meters above
sea level)
Ratio of Population within
100km of coast
Harvard CID – Geography
Datasets
Ratio of population within
100km of ice-free coast or
navigable river to total
population
Typical Density Harvard CID – Geography
Datasets
Typical population density
experienced by an individual
(persons/km
2)
Percentage area in tropics Harvard CID – Geography
Datasets
Urbanization Rate (1980) World Development
Indicators (WDI) World Bank
(2002)
Percentage of population
living outside of rural areas.
Size of the foreign sector Constructed from data in
Barro and Lee (1995)
Defined as the sum of imports
and exports over total GDP.
Labor Force Participation rate Labor force:  WDI
Population: Penn Tables,
v.5.6.a
Defined as labor force over
population.
Share of military spending
over GDP (5 year averages)
Barro and Lee (1995) Ratio of nominal government
expenditure on defense to
nominal GDP.
Gini Index World Income Inequality
Database –United nations
Development Program
Earliest available value of the
Gini index
Corruption Index 1980-85 Transparency International
http://www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/i
cr.htm
The index is based on surveys
that ask for perceptions about
corruption. It takes values
from 0 (most corrupt) to 10














BFA Burkina Faso 20
BDI Burundi 5
CMR Cameroon 10







CRI Costa Rica 49
CIV Cote d'Ivoire 7
CYP Cyprus 24






































SLE Sierra Leone 35
SOM Somalia 20
LKA Sri Lanka 50
SDN Sudan 30
SWZ Swaziland 25
TZA Tanzania 28
THA Thailand 20
TGO Togo 36
TUN Tunisia 9
UGA Uganda 31
URY Uruguay 15
YUG Yugoslavia 29
ZAR Zaire 63
ZMB Zambia 30
ZWE Zimbabwe 5